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a b s t r a c t
Guirao and Rubio (2010) [12] introduce an economicmodel, which generalizes the classical
duopoly of Cournot type, where the competitors are located around a circle or a line and
each firm competes ‘‘à la Cournot’’ with its right and left neighboring. For the case of having
three and four players, we describe completely the bifurcations of equilibria in terms of the
production costs of each firm and we study the stability of them. Moreover, for the case of
four players we provide some information on the two-periodic orbits of the system.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and statement of the main result
Cournot duopolywas introduced by Cournot [1]who is considered one of the forerunners of themodernmicroeconomics.
The process consists of two firms which produce an identical good and which compete for the market. In each step of the
process the firms decide the amount of product to be introduced in the market, and for making this decision both firms
should know the amount of product introduced in the market in the previous step by the rival firm. This economic process
is mathematically modeled by the following two-dimensional discrete dynamical system
F(x, y) = (g(y), f (x)) (1)
where f , g are continuous self-maps defined on a compact interval which can be considered, without loss of generality, by
normalization [0, 1]. The maps f and g are called the reaction functions and determine the decisions made by the firms.
Note that if firm A put on the market at the beginning of the game α0 product and firm B put β0, in the next step of the
game firm A will produce g(β0), i.e. an amount of product which directly depends on the production level of the firm B in
the previous step, on the other hand, firm Bwill produce f (α0) and so on. Therefore, whole of the process is governed by the
dynamics of the discrete system (1) which strongly depends on the dynamics of the one-dimensional interval maps f and g .
Duopoly is an intermediate situation betweenmonopoly and perfect competition, and analytically is amore complicated
case. The reason for this is that oligopolist must consider not only the behaviors of the customers, but also those of the
competitors and their reactions. Thus this model has been studied in the literature from different points of view; see for
instance [2–9] or [10].
While dynamic properties of duopolies have been extensively studied, adjustment dynamics in Cournot processes with
more than two players have received much less attention as a consequence of the difficulties which appear for studying
discrete dynamical systems with a dimension higher than two. The direct generalization of the Cournot duopoly situation is
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the Cournot oligopoly, i.e. consider n firms which produce an identical good and in each step of the process any firm knows
the amount of product generated by the n− 1 rival firms in the previous step. Now, the systems which model the situation
are given by
F(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (f1(x2, x3, . . . , xn), f2(x1, x3, . . . , xn), . . . , fn(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1)) (2)
where fi : [0, 1]n−1 → [0, 1] is a continuousmap.We note that the reaction function fi depends on n−1 variables of indices
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j ≠ i.
To study the dynamics for a system like (2) is quite complicated by the ignorance of the topological dynamics of
n-dimensional discrete dynamical systems with n > 2 (e.g., note that the possible ω-limit sets of the orbits for these type
of systems are not characterized).
Thus, if we want to have some chance of describing dynamics we need to simplify the system with the cost of losing
information by the players on the production level of the rivals.
In [11] the following model called Cournot-like system is introduced.
Definition 1. A continuous map φ from [0, 1]n into itself is Cournot-like if it is of the form
φ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (φσ(1)(xσ(1)), . . . , φσ(n−1)(xσ(n−1)), φσ(n)(xσ(n))),
where φi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is continuous, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and σ is a cyclic permutation of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
In the economic situation models by these type of systems the level of information is quite limited because any player
firm only has information on the production level of one of the other firms in the previous step of the process. For these type
of systems, see [11], there is a characterization of the dynamical simplicity.
From our point of view Cournot-like models do not represent a truthful economic situation since it is very difficult to
explain the fact that each player firm can only have information on other firm having a complete ignorance on the rest of
player behavior. For that reason Guirao and Rubio [12] introduce a new model where the information level is higher than
in Cournot-like ones and where there is more chance for describing dynamical properties. See next section for a concrete
description of this model. The aim of the present paper is, for dimensions 3 and 4, to describe completely the bifurcations of
equilibria of this new model in terms of the production costs of each firm and we study the stability of them. Moreover, for
the case of four players we are able to prove that the system has no two-periodic orbits. The statement of our main results
is the following.
Theorem 2. Let (F3,Ω3) be the discrete dynamical system introduced in (3). Then
(i) if c1, c2 and c3 are not equal, there exists a unique equilibrium equal to (0, 0, 0) which is strongly unstable;
(ii) if ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, there exists another equilibrium, apart from that stated in (i), of the form ( 29c , 29c , 29c ) which is locally
an attractor.
Theorem 3. Let (F4,Ω4) be the discrete dynamical system introduced in (4). Then
(i) if c1, c2, c3 and c4 are arbitrary positive constants, the point (0, 0, 0, 0) is a strongly unstable equilibrium;
(ii) if ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the point ( 29c , 29c , 29c , 29c ) is a stable equilibrium;
(iii) if c1 = c3 and c2 ≠ c4 the point

α2,

2α2
c2
− 2α2, α2,

2α2
c4
− 2α2

, where α is the unique root of the cubic polynomial
−2c2c4(√c2 +√c4)+ 2(c1c2 + c1c4 + 2c2c4 + 2c1√c2c4)X − 6c1√2c2c4(√c2 +√c4)X2 + 9c1c2c4X3,
is an equilibrium. Its stability depends on the values of c2 and c4. In the case ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the equilibrium coincides
with the presented one in (ii);
(iv) if c2 = c4 and c1 ≠ c3, the equilibria are symmetric to the ones of case (iii) interchanging z withw, x with y, c2 with c1, and
c4 with c3.
Moreover, the system has no two-periodic orbits.
2. The model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players (i.e., rival firms which produces an identical good) and assume that they
are physically located around a circle or a line. We assume that the firms compete ‘‘à la Cournot’’ in a local way, i.e., each
firm i ∈ N compete with its closest neighboring in the right and left direction. Let Bαi ⊂ N be the neighboring located at a
distance equal to α of the firm i in the right and left direction. If we denote by (x1, . . . , xn) the production of the firms in
some moment and by (c1, c2, . . . , cn) their production costs, the best response function for the firm iwill have the form
φi(xBαi ) =
 k∈Bαi xk
ci
−

k∈Bαi
xk.
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We consider that Bαi is composed by the left and right neighboring, i.e., α = 1. In this case, we note that if n = 2, we have
the classical situation of the Cournot duopoly.
If we suppose that the number of players is equal to three, the model is governed by the three-dimensional discrete
dynamical system given by
F3(x, y, z) =

y+ z
c1
− (y+ z),

x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),

x+ y
c3
− (x+ y)

(3)
defined inΩ3 = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x+ y > 0, x+ z > 0, y+ z > 0}.
In the same way, for the case of having four firms, the model is defined by a four-dimensional discrete system
F4(x, y, z, w) of the form (x, y, z, w) goes to
y+ w
c1
− (y+ w),

x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),

y+ w
c3
− (y+ w),

x+ z
c4
− (x+ z)

(4)
defined inΩ4 = {(x, y, z, w) ∈ R4 : y+ w > 0, x+ z > 0}.
The objective of the next section is to study the equilibria of systems (3) and (4) in terms of production costs c ′i s. In the
case n = 4 we give some information on the two-periodic orbits.
3. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we state the equilibria and their bifurcations for the system (3) depending on c ′i s.
Proof of Theorem 2. We consider the map F3 given by
(x, y, z)→

y+ z
c1
− (y+ z),

x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),

x+ y
c3
− (x+ y)

.
A point (x, y, z)will be an equilibrium point if and only if it is held simultaneously
• k1 =

y+z
c1
− (x+ y+ z) = 0,
• k2 =

x+z
c2
− (x+ y+ z) = 0,
• k3 =

x+y
c3
− (x+ y+ z) = 0.
Clearly, one solution of the system, for any value of c ′i s, is (0, 0, 0). Now, consider the equivalent system e1 = e2 = e3 = 0
where
• e1 = k1 − k2• e2 = k1 − k3• e3 = k2 − k3.
It is easy to note that the case c3 = c1 + c2 does not provide any fixed point different from the origin. If c3 is different from
c1 + c2, the solution of the system e1 = e2 = e3 = 0 is
x = − 2c1z
c1 + c2 − c3 +

2z
c1 + c2 − c3 ,
y = − 2c2z
c1 + c2 − c3 +

2z
c1 + c2 − c3 ,
z = − 2c3z
c1 + c2 − c3 +

2z
c1 + c2 − c3 .
This system has a solution different from z = 0 in the case ci = c , i = 1, 2, 3. Thus, the solution has the form
−2z +

2z
c
,−2z +

2z
c
,−2z +

2z
c

,
now for the equilibrium condition
−2z +

2z
c
= z,
and therefore the equilibrium point has the form
 2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c

.
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In short, we obtain that (0, 0, 0) is always an equilibrium point, and when c1 = c2 = c3 then
 2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c

is another
equilibrium point.
For studying the stability of the equilibria we compute the matrixM composed by the partial derivatives of the reaction
functions of F . Indeed,
M =

∂F 13
∂x
∂F 13
∂y
∂F 13
∂z
∂F 23
∂x
∂F 23
∂y
∂F 23
∂z
∂F 33
∂x
∂F 33
∂y
∂F 33
∂z
 =

0 −1+ 1
2c1

y+z
c1
−1+ 1
2c1

y+z
c1
−1+ 1
2c2

y+z
c2
0 −1+ 1
2c2

y+z
c2
−1+ 1
2c3

y+z
c3
−1+ 1
2c3

y+z
c3
0

.
In this setting, we conclude that the origin is strongly unstable in all directions because the partial derivatives which ap-
pear in thematrixM tend to infinitywhen (x, y, z)→ 0. Let us assume that the costs c ′i s are equal to c , then the characteristic
polynomial of the matrixM evaluated at the equilibrium point
 2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c

is equal to Pλ = 132 (−1+ 6λ− 32λ3). Now note
that the roots of Pλ are equal to 14 double and− 12 . Thus, the equilibrium point
 2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c

is locally an attractor because the
absolute value of the eigenvalues at this fixed point are smaller than 1, ending the proof. 
Remark 4. The dynamics on the straight line x = y = z when c1 = c2 = c3 = c , is equivalent to the dynamics of an
one-dimensional map f : R→ R defined by f (x) =

2x
c − 2x. On the line x = y = z the fixed point x = 29c is an attractor.
The point x = 0 is strongly unstable.
4. Proof of Theorem 3
The equations of the equilibria points of the system (Ω4, F4), where F4 is the transformation such that every (x, y, z, w)
go to 
y+ w
c1
− (y+ w),

x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),

y+ w
c3
− (y+ w),

x+ z
c4
− (x+ z)

are the following:
• k1 =

y+w
c1
− (x+ y+ w) = 0,
• k2 =

x+z
c2
− (x+ y+ z) = 0,
• k3 =

y+w
c3
− (y+ w + z) = 0,
• k4 =

x+z
c4
− (x+ z + w) = 0.
On the other hand the matrixM composed by the partial derivatives of the reaction functions of F4 is
M =

0 −1+ 1
2c1

w+y
c1
0 −1+ 1
2c1

w+y
c1
−1+ 1
2c2

x+z
c2
0 −1+ 1
2c2

x+z
c2
0
0 −1+ 1
2c3

w+y
c3
0 −1+ 1
2c3

w+y
c3
−1+ 1
2c4

x+z
c4
0 −1+ 1
2c4

x+z
c4
0

where entry ai,j correspond to
∂F i4
∂αj
with α1 = x, α2 = y, α3 = z and α4 = w.
Clearly, by the two previous expressions, (0, 0, 0, 0) is always a fixed point that is strongly unstable because the deriva-
tives of the linear part of the map at this point go to infinity.
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Now we consider three different cases.
• Case c1 = c2 = c3 = c. In this case the equilibria equations are reduced to
−x− 2y+

2y
c
= 0, −2x+

2x
c
− y = 0.
Solving this system we obtain that there is an additional equilibrium point of the form ( 29c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ) which is locally
stable because its eigenvalues are (0, 0, −12 ,
1
2 ) if we assume that c > 0.• Case c3 = c1 and c4 ≠ c2. In this setting equations of equilibria have the form
−w − x− y+

x+ y
c1
= 0 wherew = −2x+

2x
c4
and y = −2x+

2x
c2
.
Computing, we reduce the problem to solve
3x−

2x
c2
−

2x
c4
+
−4x+ 2xc2 + 2xc4
c1
= 0. (5)
We can assume that x is not zero, otherwise we obtain the equilibrium point (0, 0, 0, 0). Dividing Eq. (5) by
√
xwe obtain
3
√
x−

2
c2
−

2
c4
+
−4+ 2c2x + 2c4x
c1
= 0. (6)
Replacing variable
√
x by X in Eq. (6), we have
3X −

2
c2
−

2
c4
+
−4X + 2c2 + 2c4
c1X
= 0. (7)
Now, we eliminate the squareroot containing the variable X in Eq. (7) taking squares, but note that doing this we can add
fictious solutions. Thus, we have
−2c2c4(√c2 +√c4)+ 2(c1c2 + c1c4 + 2c2c4 + 2c1√c2c4)X (8)
−6c1

2c2c4(
√
c2 +√c4)X2 + 9c1c2c4X3 = 0, (9)
and therefore computing is stated that the pointα2,2α2
c2
− 2α2, α2,

2α2
c4
− 2α2
 ,
where α is the unique root of the cubic polynomial (8) is an equilibrium of the system different from the origin. Note that
the stability of this equilibrium depends on the values of c2 and c4 and in the case ci = c , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the equilibrium
coincides with the presented one in (ii).
• Case c4 = c2 and c3 ≠ c1. In fact the equilibria points are symmetric to ones obtained in the previous case interchanging
z withw, xwith y, c2 with c1, and c4 with c3.
For the case ci = c , i = 1, 2, 3, 4,we study the two-periodic orbits of the system (i.e., non-equilibria pointswith the property
F 2(x, y, z, w) = (x, y, z, w).) The equations of the two-periodic points, for the case ci = c , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are the following.
• g1 = x+ 2z − 2

x+z
c +

−2x−2z+2
√
x+z
c
c = 0,
• g2 = 2w + y− 2

w+y
c +

−2w−2y+2

w+y
c
c = 0,
• g3 = 2x+ z − 2

x+z
c +

−2x−2z+2
√
x+z
c
c = 0,
• g4 = w + 2y− 2

w+y
c +

−2w−2y+2

w+y
c
c = 0.
In this setting, g1 − g3 = −x+ z and g2 − g4 = w− y being z = x andw = y. Therefore, the unique solution of this system
is the fixed point ( 29c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ), ending the proof. 
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